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Corporate Governance and Financial Stability in US Banks:  
Do Indirect Interlocks Matter? 
 
Abstract 
In the context of the Depository Institution Management Interlocks Act of 1978 (Interlocks 
Act), we investigate the structure and implications of the professional connections among bank 
directors. Based on a hand-collected unique dataset for a sample of 168 US commercial banks 
listed continuously from 2009 to 2015, we find that the barriers set out in the Interlocks Act 
have been circumvented by the establishment of indirect interlocks that allow for mass 
professional connections among bank directors. Our evidence suggests that bank well-
connectedness through indirect interlocks has a significant impact on financial stability. In 
particular, we find, in support of the extended resource-based view (RBV), that well-connected 
banks mitigate their credit and insolvency risks but, contrary to our expectation, lower bank 
capitalisation. Our evidence suggests that the Interlocks Act and bank governance reforms need 
to consider the role of professional communications among bank directors to fully achieve their 
intended goals. 
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Many researchers attempt to explore the role of corporate leader interlocks in shaping corporate 
actions and outcomes (Davis, Yoo, & Baker, 2003; Fich & Shivdasani, 2006; Haunschild, 
1993; Homroy & Slechten, 2017; Horton, Millo, & Serafeim, 2012; Hwang & Kim, 2009; 
Ingram & Roberts, 2000; Joh & Jung, 2018: Kaczmarek, Kimino, & Pye, 2014; Larcker, So, 
& Wang, 2013; Mizruchi, 1996). A key weakness of this extensive research base is a failure to 
describe how social, as well as professional, communication between board members 
influences the ability of boards to execute their responsibilities, with existing studies focussing 
on the direct association between directorship interlocks and company economic and strategic 
outcomes. Indeed, only Carpenter and Westphal (2001) surveyed non-executive directors and 
chief executive officers (CEOs) of the Forbes 1000 index of US industrial and services 
companies, concluding that boards with directors who have external network ties to 
strategically related organisations could provide better advice and counsel, thereby 
contributing to the strategic decision-making process. 
In the context of US antitrust laws, Lang and Lockhart (1990) highlighted the mass 
exploitation of indirect interlocks among directors of eight truck companies operating in the 
airline industry as a legal means to establish intra-industry board connections. According to 
US antitrust laws, in particular, the 1914 Clayton Act (Fear & Kobrak, 2010; Platt & Platt, 
2012; Zajac, 1988) and 1978 Depository Institution Management Interlocks Act (Interlocks 
Act) (Baccini & Marroni, 2016; FDIC, 2016; Roche, 2009), holding a seat on the board of two 
competing companies leads to direct interlocks between those companies, suggesting possible 
anticompetitive effects with adverse impacts on market health. In this context, indirect 
interlocks are simply another type of professional connection that occur when directors from 
two companies are affiliated with and/or sit on the board of a third organisation. To date, there 
has been scarce empirical testing of the economic consequences of professional connections 
among US competitors through indirect interlocks. 
This study suggests the US banking sector to address this literature gap by (i) 
investigating the very existence of indirect interlocks as a special type of legal connection 
among bank directors that circumvents barriers set by US antitrust laws and (ii) examining the 
extent to which bank credit, insolvency and capital risks are affected by the interbank networks. 
Practitioners and researchers agree on the essence of the detailed investigation that links board 
governance and risk-taking practices in the banking sector. The reasons are two-fold. First, 
bank stability is the backbone of the stability of other sectors (Berger, Klapper, & Turk-Ariss, 
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2009). Therefore, controlling bank risk-taking, which is a key driver of bank financial stability, 
is perceived as a fiduciary duty owed to the whole economy. Second, compared with non-
financial sectors, the governance of bank boards has unique challenges and uncertainties due 
to the agency problems that arise when protecting diverse stakeholder interests, especially after 
the 2008 financial crisis and its adverse consequences for financial institutions. 
The role of directorship interlocks in the banking sector has recently received 
considerable research attention (Elyasiani & Zhang, 2015; Muller-Kahle & Lewellyn, 2011; 
Nguyen, Hagendorff, & Eshraghi, 2015). However, the narrow emphasis on board busyness 
leads to inconclusive evidence. Indeed, John, De Masi, and Paci (2016) call for future research 
to consider the influence of board/director networks in the banking sector. By constructing 
unique social network matrices that address the interbank networks, we intend to fill this gap 
in the banking literature and offer an improved understanding of the role of director interlocks 
in the banking sector. Drawing on the insights of extended resource-based view (extended 
RBV), this study posits that bank financial stability depends on board social capital created by 
strong professional connections among bank directors. Specifically, we argue that a well-
connected bank boardroom signals a unique board quality (i.e., board social capital) in the form 
of facilitating effective circulation of rare, confidential information, an exceptional 
accumulation of boardroom competences in the form of relevant knowledge, skills and 
expertise, and a superior ability to mitigate the competitive uncertainties, ultimately 
contributing to bank financial stability. 
Using a sample of 168 US commercial banks that were listed consistently in the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and Nasdaq in the period 
2009 to 2015, we found that indirect interlocks are used commonly for professional 
connections among bank directors. We also found that well-connectedness among banks is 
significantly associated with a low credit risk and a low insolvency risk, but with a high capital 
risk. Our results are consistent with the extended RBV perspective, indicating that directors of 
well-connected bank boards are highly qualified and competent to protect various stakeholder 
interests by mitigating both bank credit risk and bank insolvency risk. Moreover, but contrary 
to our expectation, well-connected boards signal a new model of shareholder-friendly boards 
that, through minimising the adverse effects of holding very high capital ratios, favours the 
interests of bank shareholders, while at the same time, avoiding high-risk decisions and 
strategies. Our additional analysis demonstrates the persistent effect of bank well-
connectedness on the following year’s bank risk exposures. 
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This study offers several contributions. Based on the extended RBV, we broaden the 
focus of board quality research to link interbank networks, in a setting that prevents direct 
interlocks among competing companies, with bank financial stability. Our evidence contributes 
to both the banking and corporate governance literature by proposing board social capital 
created by professional connections among bank directors as an antecedent of bank financial 
stability. Attention, then, will be directed to the professional connections among competitors 
as a new informal governance mechanism in the US banking sector that affects board ability to 
perform its tasks. In this context, this study challenges the universality of admonitions for 
communications among US competitors. 
2. Theoretical background and conceptual framework 
The role of the board of directors has been examined widely in corporate governance literature. 
In general, board ability to foster effective task performance is contingent on competent 
oversight of management behaviour (agency theory), with the board acting as a mentor to the 
management by providing sound professional advice (stewardship theory) and supplying the 
organisation with required resources through connections with the external environment 
(resource dependence theory) (Adams, Hermalin, & Weisbach, 2010; John et al., 2016; 
McNulty, Florackis, & Ormrod, 2013; Minichilli, Zattoni, & Zona, 2009; Muller-Kahle & 
Lewellyn, 2011; Srivastav & Hagendorff, 2016; Zona & Zattoni, 2007). Therefore, poor 
company performance and high risk, both of which contribute to financial instability, are 
downstream consequences of board inability to perform tasks effectively. 
Board social capital is widely regarded as a critical aspect of board behaviour and 
performance. According to Walter, Lechner, and Kellermanns (2007, p. 700), “social capital 
has been broadly defined as the benefits that actors derive from their social relationships”. 
Interlocking directorates are formal social connections that, through evolving trust and 
cooperation among various organisation board members, can develop board social capital 
(Buchnea, 2017). A growing body of research, drawing on agency theory and resource 
dependence theory, argues that interlocks can affect board ability through enhancing director 
knowledge and expertise, which are used effectively in their supervisory role (agency theory) 
and for information provision and networking, so that they act as efficient suppliers of 
resources (resource dependence theory) (Burt, 1997; Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Hillman & 
Dalziel, 2003; Mizruchi, 1996; Wiseman, Cuevas‐Rodríguez, & Gomez‐Mejia, 2012). 
However, relying heavily on agency theory and resource dependence theory to explain the 
 5 
positive implications of external directorships on improving (limiting) company performance 
(risks) demonstrates that board members are merely controllers and suppliers rather than 
strategists (Huse, 2005). This leads to the contemporary view where board members are “a 
highly valued organisational asset which has the potential to contribute to sustainable 
competitive advantage” (Minichilli, Gabrielsson, & Huse, 2007, p. 610). 
2.1. Towards the extended resource-based view (RBV) 
Some effort has been made to integrate RBV principles with social network theory perspectives 
to recognise social capital developed through buyer-supplier relationships (Whipple, Wiedmer, 
& Boyer, 2015), strategic alliances (Ireland, Hitt, & Vaidyanath, 2002; Kang & Zaheer, 2018; 
Lavie, 2006), and business group affiliation (Popli, Ladkani, & Gaur, 2017) as a resource that 
affects company performance. In particular, prior studies suggest that strategic connections 
between companies create a resource bundle that leverages and complements their internal 
resources with scarce resources and capabilities (Ireland et al., 2002; Rauch, Rosenbusch, 
Unger, & Frese, 2016; Whipple et al., 2015). According to Barney (1991, p. 101), resources 
are “all assets, capabilities, organizational processes, firm attributes, information, knowledge, 
etc. controlled by a firm that enable the firm to conceive of and implement strategies that 
improve its efficiency and effectiveness”. In broad terms, traditional RBV states that internally 
generated resources (tangible or intangible) of a company are regarded only as assets that create 
and add a sustainable competitive advantage when they are (i) controlled by the company, (ii) 
valuable, (iii) rare, (iv) inimitable, and (v) non-substitutable (Barney, 1991; Lavie, 2006; Toms, 
2002). 
Applying the above five criteria in a networked environment requires strict clarification 
of how the value created by social capital, formed through external connections, can generate 
a sustainable internal resource. Lavie (2006) developed an extended RBV in a first attempt to 
incorporate social network theories into traditional RBV. The extended RBV suggests that 
having a complete right to use a resource is not useful when the resource does not provide any 
potential service or benefit (Lavie, 2006; Popli et al., 2017). Furthermore, the extended RBV 
reveals that, in a network environment, the nature of the connection between actors determines 
and signifies, to a great extent, the value, inimitability and rarity of such connections (Ireland 
et al., 2002; Ortiz-de-Mandojana & Aragon-Correa, 2015; Rauch et al., 2016), suggesting that 
not all connections and networks have similar impact (Brown & Drake, 2013; Carpenter & 
Westphal, 2001). 
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Carpenter and Westphal (2001) postulate that the value of board interlocks as a tool to 
enhance board ability to effectively supervise and advise management is context-dependent 
and contingent on the type of companies to which the focal company board of directors is 
interlocked. The impact of the extent of industry diversity of the companies in which directors 
are affiliated is a matter of current controversy (Chen & Lin, 2016a; Lavie, 2006). From one 
perspective, it is assumed that information obtained, as well as knowledge and skills gained 
from director affiliations with similar companies, might be somehow redundant because the 
similarity between the companies might be coincidental (Basuil & Datta, 2017; Ortiz-de-
Mandojana & Aragon-Correa, 2015). By contrast, it has been suggested that holding seats on 
boards of companies that operate similarly would add value to board quality by ensuring that 
circulated information is relevant and by accumulating the value of shared knowledge and 
expertise; this, in turn, enhances the effectiveness of board task performance (Carpenter & 
Westphal, 2001; Mazzola, Perrone, & Kamuriwo, 2016). 
Carpenter and Westphal (2001) used primary data collected from a survey distributed to 
non-executive directors of 600 large and medium-sized US industrial and service companies 
to investigate the extent to which board contribution in making strategic decisions is affected 
by the external networks of directors. The authors provide evidence that, in a stable 
environment, a board of directors that appoints directors holding board seats of, or tied to, 
companies operating similarly (strategically related companies) is more able to accomplish its 
tasks effectively, both in supervisory and advisory roles, and more able to be involved promptly 
in strategic decision makingi. In accordance with Lavie’s (2006) development of the extended 
RBV and findings reported by Carpenter and Westphal (2001), social connections among 
competitors through board networks form a new board social capital that can create a resource 
within the boardroom and, thus, enhance overall board quality. 
Communication among the leaders of competitors is an important form of external social 
connection, and this communication has received growing research attention in recent years. 
On the one hand, Baker and Faulkner (1993), Dobbin and Dowd (1997), and Podolny and 
Scott-Morton (1999) showed how illegal social relationships among competitors facilitate 
price-fixing conspiracies. Additionally, concerns have been raised regarding the moral hazard 
associated with knowledge and skills leakage among competitors (Pahnke, McDonald, Wang, 
& Hallen, 2015). On the other hand, Ingram and Roberts (2000) investigated informal 
connections among managers, who were friends, of competing hotels in Sydney; they found 
that these connections had a positive impact on hotel performance, suggesting that such 
friendships ease professional collaboration, mitigate competition and enhance information 
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sharing. Additionally, Okazaki and Sawada (2011) examined the impact of the direct interlocks 
among Japanese banks on their survivability before the Second World War; they reported a 
positive association between interbank networks and bank ability to avoid potential financial 
distress and bankruptcy, revealing that professional connections among banks contribute to the 
financial system stability. 
Interestingly, direct interlocking directorates among competitors (i.e., when a director of 
one company is also a director of a competitor) are rare, mainly because the US antitrust laws 
prohibit an individual from holding a position as a director or management official in two non-
affiliated corporations operating similarly in the market (Federal Trade Commission, 2012). 
The purpose of the US antitrust laws is to prevent collusion and monopolistic behaviour and to 
ensure healthy competition in the economy. The phenomenon of indirect interlocks, which 
occur when directors from two competitors are affiliated with and/or sit on the board of a third 
party, host non-competing company, governmental organisation and other nonprofit 
organisation, is the sole means of facilitating professional communications and legitimatising 
connections among competitors (Baccini & Marroni, 2016; Burt, 1980; Lang & Lockhart, 
1990). Fig. 1 illustrates direct interlocks among competitors, which are prohibited under the 
US antitrust laws, and how indirect interlocks can be formed between competitors. Lang and 
Lockhart (1990) found that, under the enforcement of Section 8 of the 1914 Clayton Antitrust 
Act, which prohibits direct interlocks among competitors, there was an enormous increase in 
the number of indirect interlocks among eight US truck companies in the 1970s following the 
deregulation of the US domestic airline industry. Lang and Lockhart (1990), drawing on 
resource dependence theory, postulated that the reconciliation with high levels of competitive 
uncertainties that followed industry deregulation was a key driver in the excessive use of 
indirect interlocks to alleviate competitive uncertainty. 
[Insert Fig. 1 here] 
Notably, there is limited but emerging empirical evidence that indirect interlocks are a 
form of board social capital that has an apparent impact on corporate outcomes. For example, 
Palmer, Jennings, and Zhou (1993) showed that, during the 1960s, the adoption of a multi-
divisional structure is contingent on the extent to which the company has indirect interlocks 
with adopters of the multi-divisional structure. Ahuja (2000) also reported that indirect 
interlocks among companies in the international chemicals industry operating in Western 
Europe, Japan and the US play a significant positive role in developing patents. The positive 
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implications of indirect interlocks on company performance suggest that valuable information 
circulates among companies through indirect interlocks, connecting companies to rare 
information sources (Ahuja, 2000; Lang & Lockhart, 1990; Palmer et al., 1993). 
Notwithstanding, one should consider that indirect interlocks have been regarded as weak ties 
(Granovetter, 1973) that are only influential when the boardroom depends on them as ultimate 
connection tools and when the boardroom is well-connected and central in the network through 
multiple indirect interlocks (Ahuja, 2000). 
A well-connected boardroom, developed through multiple interlocking directorates, 
demonstrates that its organisation has a prominent position in the network that reduces social 
and physical distance, removes organisational boundaries and connects the organisation to its 
external environment (Filatotchev & Nakajima, 2010; Wilson, Buchnea, & Tilba, 2018). 
Research on board governance provides empirical support for the importance of companies 
taking a prominent network position when seeking to increase the number of acquisitions 
(Haunschild & Beckman, 1998), company performance (Larcker et al., 2013), reporting quality 
(Felix, 2016), new product development (Mazzola et al., 2016), and post-acquisition (long-
term) performance (Popli et al., 2017). Thus, a well-connected board has greater access to a 
wide range of information, and its members have superior knowledge, expertise and skills, all 
of which are vital to simplify and improve the accomplishment of its responsibilities (Burt, 
1980; Singh & Delios, 2017). Accordingly, being professionally well-connected with 
competitors through indirect interlocks, in a legal system that prohibits any direct interlocks 
among competitors, signals unique connections that form a new board social capital; this social 
capital can create valuable, rare and inimitable intangible resources that endow the boardroom 
with credible, highly diversified and relevant additional information, knowledge, skills and 
expertise. Understanding the role of indirect interlocks among US competitors, with a focus on 
highly regulated sectors, such as banking, remains challenging in the context of “black box” 
corporate boardrooms. 
2.2. The banking sector 
“Trust is the expectation that another person (or institution) will perform actions that are 
beneficial, or at least not detrimental, to [stakeholders] regardless of [their] capacity to monitor 
those actions” (Sapienza & Zingales, 2012, p. 124). Since the mortgage crisis, financial 
institutions, particularly banks, have been continuously subject to a lack of trust as well as 
excessive pressures to regularly signify and present remarkable performance to shareholders, 
 9 
sustainable stability to depositors and borrowers, good corporate image to customers and the 
public, and legitimacy to regulators and legislators (Jizi, Salama, Dixon, & Stratling, 2014; 
Peni & Vähämaa, 2012). Factors such as a substantial level of leverage and the significant 
mismatch between bank assets and liabilities reflect the key attributes that make banks more 
complex and opaque than non-financial companies (Elyasiani & Zhang, 2015; Srivastav & 
Hagendorff, 2016). Moreover, unlike non-financial companies, the board of directors in the 
banking sector has a fiduciary responsibility to ensure overall financial stability that serves not 
only the interests of shareholders but also those of other stakeholders, including depositors, 
borrowers, and regulators (Aebi, Sabato, & Schmid, 2012; Elyasiani & Zhang, 2015; John et 
al., 2016; Pathan & Skully, 2010). 
Bank board governance has been the subject of intense regulatory attention and public 
scrutiny, with much criticism of the significant board contribution to the 2007 subprime 
mortgage crisis and subsequent 2008 credit crunch (Berger, Imbierowicz, & Rauch, 2016; 
Pathan & Faff, 2013; Peni & Vähämaa, 2012; Srivastav & Hagendorff, 2016). A growing body 
of research emphasises the importance of board structure such as high levels of board 
independence (Akbar, Kharabsheh, Poletti-Hughes, & Shah, 2017; Liang, Xu, & Jiraporn, 
2013; Pathan, 2009), proper CEO/Chair separation (Talavera, Yin, & Zhang, 2018), high levels 
of board membership by women (Farag & Mallin, 2017), the existence of senior role models 
for women (Palvia, Vähämaa, & Vähämaa, 2015), and board quality such as high number of 
educated bank directors to the PhD level (Berger, Kick, & Schaeck, 2014) and the presence of 
financial experts (García-Sánchez, García-Meca, & Cuadrado-Ballesteros, 2017) to sustain low 
levels of bank risk-taking, enhance bank stability, and restore the trust of various stakeholders. 
Empirical research on the role of directorship interlocks in banks has shown that board 
busyness, as measured by the average number of board positions held by non-executive 
directors, was associated with higher levels of risky subprime lending in the period 1997 to 
2005 (Muller-Kahle & Lewellyn, 2011). Nguyen et al. (2015) also reported that board 
busyness, proxied by the number of current directorships held by bank non-executive directors, 
negatively affects the market performance of US banks. The negative impact of board busyness 
on bank performance and risk suggests that busy directors in the banking sector hinder board 
ability to effectively meet its fiduciary obligations. However, Elyasiani and Zhang (2015) 
provide evidence that director busyness—i.e., holding many direct interlocks with other 
companies—has a significant impact on enhancing (reducing) US bank holding company 
performance (risk). That is, holding multiple directorships enables directors to bring 
knowledge, expertise and connections that strengthen board performance. We address 
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inconclusive results from previous studies by linking bank well-connectednessii with other 
banks to bank financial stability; this is, to our knowledge, the first attempt to make this link. 
Sustaining bank financial stability requires the board of directors to manage and lessen risk-
taking activities effectively. To do so, bank board members are responsible for setting and 
overseeing the implementation of policies and procedures related to risk-taking decisions, such 
as credit, insolvency and capital risks. To model the theoretical relationship between bank well-
connectedness and bank financial stability, we extend the contemporary RBV perspective to 
the banking sector, conjecturing that bank well-connectedness with other banks through 
indirect interlocks signals board social capital that enhances board ability to perform its tasks 
effectively (supplying, advising and monitoring) towards controlling risk-taking activities, thus 
promoting bank financial stability (see Fig. 2). 
[Insert Fig. 2 here] 
2.3. Hypotheses development 
Several studies have reported, drawing on resource dependence theory, that directorship 
interlocks between companies facilitate the contagion of strategies and policies through sharing 
critical and strategic information (Cai, Dhaliwal, Kim, & Pan, 2014; Chiu, Teoh, & Tian, 
2012). In the extended RBV paradigm, indirectly interlocked banks have privileged access to 
valuable and confidential information from other banks regarding critical risk mitigation 
strategies and ways to improve overall bank financial stability. However, it is not possible to 
access or obtain accurate and diversified information in a highly regulated environment without 
having a strong network (Larcker et al., 2013; Mazzola et al., 2016; Renneboog & Zhao, 2014: 
Singh & Delios, 2017). Accordingly, one can argue that banks with many indirect connections 
to other banks or that act as bridges between unconnected banks would have access to more 
accurate and reliable information, usually with almost no additional cost. Board social capital, 
developed through board well-connectedness, therefore, increases the value of the circulated 
information, even if that information is readily available in the market (Haunschild & 
Beckham, 1998; Lavie, 2006; Ortiz-de-Mandojana & Aragon-Correa, 2015). Ingram and 
Roberts (2000) showed, through conducting interviews with leaders of hotels in Sydney, that 
friendship among leaders serves as an effective and reliable tool to obtain significant 
information about the hotel market. Applying this perspective to the financial sector, a bank 
that holds a central position in the banking network signals a well-endowed boardroom that has 
greater access to important strategic information than an isolated bank. 
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In addition to the benefits of exchanging essential information, it is evident that 
knowledge transfer is another important outcome of the interlocks (Walter et al., 2007). Prior 
studies have shown the importance of knowledge leakage among strategically related 
companies in accumulating director/board human capital, thus enhancing the board’s ability to 
provide prompt and relevant advice (see Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Ireland et al., 2002). 
Since director knowledge and expertise are essential qualities for undertaking a board advisory 
role in complex sectors such as banking (Berger et al., 2014; De Andrés & Vallelado, 2008; 
Elyasiani & Zhang, 2015), the additional human capital linked to indirect connections among 
bank directors is likely to aggregate boardroom capabilities with highly relevant knowledge 
and expertise required to fulfil its advisory role. However, ensuring the level of resource 
diversification requires a high number of connections between directors and a prominent 
position in the corporate network (Basuil & Datta, 2017; Popli et al., 2017). Accordingly, 
having well-connected bank directors signals stronger opportunities to aggregate boardroom 
knowledge with diversifiable, relevant and updated knowledge and skills. Well-connectedness 
then enhances the board’s ability to consult effectively, professionally and promptly to develop 
strategies and policies that minimise bank risk and pursue bank financial stability. 
While board competencies depend on having members with relevant banking skills and 
experience, having strong connections with other banks affects how directors and managers are 
incentivised when making risky decisions. The social theory of agency considers the social 
capital created by corporate networks as a new governance mechanism that reduces agency 
costs by eliminating information asymmetry and opportunistic behaviour (Wiseman et al., 
2012). Strong connections with companies that operate similarly reduce uncertainty by 
breaking down boundaries between connected competitors (Ingram & Roberts, 2000; Lang & 
Lockhart, 1990; Okazaki & Sawada, 2011). Therefore, having a central position in an industry-
specific network increases board ability to reduce performance pressures and mitigate 
competitive uncertainties, thus reducing the tendency of company managers to make risky or 
irrational decisions (Antoniades, 2016; Drechsler, Drechsel, Marques-Ibanez, & Schnabl, 
2016; Leblebici & Salancik, 1981), as well as allowing extensive monitoring of the company’s 
external environment (Larcker et al., 2013; Mazzola et al., 2016). Thus, the well-connectedness 
of a bank signals that its board can monitor the managerial behaviour efficiently by linking 
company management to both peers and the external environment. Opening methods of 
communication among bank managers and executives eliminate pressure and regulate manager 
incentives to make irrational or risky decisions that would affect overall bank financial 
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stability. In line with these arguments, the theoretical relationship between board social capital 
and bank financial stability, illustrated in Fig. 2, leads directly to the following hypotheses: 
 
H1: Banks with well-connected boardrooms sustain financial stability through lowering 
credit risk. 
 
H2: Banks with well-connected boardrooms sustain financial stability through lowering 
insolvency risk. 
 
H3: Banks with well-connected boardrooms sustain financial stability through enhancing 
capital adequacy. 
3. Research design and methodology 
3.1. Sample 
Our initial sample comprised all national and state US commercial banks listed as of December 
31, 2015 in the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (Amex), and 
Nasdaq. The inclusion criteria for our study sample were: (i) having a Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) code of either 6021 (assigned to national banks) or 6022 (assigned to state 
banks) and (ii) being continuously listed with completed accounting, financial, and corporate 
governance (CG) data during the seven-year period of 2009-2015. This focused dataset 
captures the existence, magnitude and implication of well-connectedness among continuously 
listed banks that operate similarly and that are uniformly regulated. Having applied these 
criteria, we obtained a balanced study sample of 504 bank-years observations for 168 banks 
(76 national banks and 92 state banks) for 2010, 2012, and 2014. Because several previous 
studies have found that board tenure does not change significantly over time (Baselga-Pascual, 
Trujillo-Ponce, Vähämaa, & Vähämaa, 2018; Reeb & Zhao, 2013), we left a two-year gap to 
allow for changes in the composition of bank boards. 
3.2. Variables 
3.2.1. Dependent variables 
A bank’s ability to manage different types of risks indicates, to a great extent, bank financial 
stability (BFS) (Berger et al., 2009). We employed three different bank risk indicators to proxy 
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for BFS. We first used credit risk, calculated by the ratio of non-performing assets to total loans 
(NPA), as the first measure of BFS. Non-performing assets reflect loans that are at least 90 days 
in default or are in arrears on scheduled payments of principal or interest (Grove, Patelli, 
Victoravich, & Xu, 2011; Thiagarajan, Ayyappan, & Ramachandran, 2011). Hence, NPA 
indicates a bank credit quality. 
Second, we used insolvency risk. We measured this indicator by the Z-SCORE, which is 
a well-established measure for the probability that negative bank returns would force it to 
default or bankrupt (Akbar et al., 2017; Bhagat, Bolton, & Lu, 2015; Elyasiani & Zhang, 2015). 
Z-SCORE is calculated as (ROA+CAR)/σ(ROA), where ROA represents earnings divided by 
assets, CAR represents the capital-asset ratio, and σ(ROA) represents the standard deviation of 
ROA. Accordingly, a Z-SCORE with a high value indicates that the bank has sufficient profit 
to cover its debt liability and, hence, has a lower probability to default or bankrupt (Bai & 
Elyasiani, 2013). The average Z-SCORE of the 168 banks over the period of study was highly 
skewed. Therefore, we used the natural logarithm of the Z-SCORE to adjust for high skewness 
(see Elyasiani & Zhang, 2015; Laeven & Levine, 2009). 
Finally, we used the Basel Tier 1 capital ratio (TIER-1), which indicates bank adherence 
to the bank’s regulatory capital ratio or, in other words, the bank’s prudence in maintaining 
adequate capital, as the third proxy for BFS. Capital levels are associated with bank willingness 
to undertake riskier activities (Berger et al., 2009) and could have significant impacts on 
attracting current and potential investors (Chen & Lin, 2016b). The BANK COMPUSTAT and 
Bloomberg databases are the sources used for the accounting and financial data. 
3.2.2. Independent variables 
We employed a bank’s well-connectedness (i.e., centrality) in the boardroom network as a 
proxy of board social capital. Due to the multidimensional nature of the centrality concept, we 
used the UCINET software package (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002) to calculate three 
basic types of commonly applied network centrality measures: degree, reachability, and 
betweenness (Ben Barka & Dardour, 2015; Larcker et al., 2013). Degree centrality (DEGREE) 
is the first-degree bank connections. Hence, a high DEGREE indicates that a bank is central in 
the network in terms of having directors who have unique direct communications with many 
other bank directors in third parties. Regarding the second board social capital proxy, this 
article used reachability centrality (REACH) to count the number of banks that can be reached 
in the network through its first-degree connections (Borgatti, Everett, & Johnson, 2018). 
Therefore, a bank is considered to be well-connected if it is connected to banks that are also 
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well-connected. Finally, we used betweenness centrality (BETWEEN) to capture the 
intermediary role of a bank in the network. Thus, BETWEEN indicates the ability of a bank to 
integrate other unconnected banks into its network and, hence, that bank’s well-connectedness 
and importance in the network (Fracassi, 2016). Thus, a bank boardroom with high 
betweenness centrality is expected to be in a dominant position. Namely, such a bank 
boardroom can access massive flows of relevant and accurate information, aggregate the 
knowledge and skills of its own members and those of different neighbours, and control the 
flow of information and resources among the unconnected banks. 
To accurately calculate the three centrality measures, we first collected biographical 
information about the bank directors mainly from the BoardEx database. To complete any 
missing biographical information, we then supplemented with hand-collected data from SEC 
filings, such as proxy statements (DEF 14A) and annual reports (10K), and from Thomson One 
Banker, Bloomberg, and LexisNexis. Next, following prior research on social network analysis 
(Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2013; Fracassi, 2016; Haunschild, 1993; Kim, 2005, 2007; Hwang 
& Kim, 2009), we performed the steps shown in Fig. 3. 
   [Insert Fig. 3 here] 
3.2.3. Control variables 
In line with prior studies (Bai & Elyasiani, 2013; Bhagat et al., 2015; Elyasiani & Zhang, 2015; 
Haynes & Hillman, 2010; Kanas, 2013; Laeven, Ratnovski, & Tong, 2016; Louati, Louhichi, 
& Boujelbene, 2016; Palvia et al., 2015; Vallascas & Hagendorff, 2013), we accounted for the 
potential effect of a set of bank-specific variables as well as various board structural and 
compositional characteristics on BFS variables. We controlled for bank size (LOGSIZE), 
profitability (PROFIT), bank risk (VOLATILITY), CEO pay-performance sensitivity (DELTA), 
leverage (LEVERAGE), bank liquidity (LOANS), bank funding policy (DEPOSITS), bank cost 
efficiency (EFFICIENCY), and dividend payout (DIVIDEND). We used BANK COMPUSTAT 
and Bloomberg to collect the accounting and financial data required to calculate bank-specific 
control variables. The percentage of independent directors (INDEPEND), average board age 
(AGE), and percentage of women on the board (WOMEN) are also included to control for the 
potential impact of board incentives, overall experience, and diversity, respectively, on BFS. 
Additionally, we aimed to use director educational background and financial experience 
(EDU_EXPERT), measured by the ratio of the number of directors who hold accounting, 
finance, and/or banking certificates to board size, as a control variable to mitigate the possible 
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omitted variable bias (i.e., unobservable heterogeneity problem). Furthermore, because equity-
based compensation is suggested to have a significant impact on allying the incentives of board 
members with shareholders’ interests (Bai & Elyasiani, 2013; Bouslah, Liñares-Zegarra, 
M'Zali, & Scholtens, 2018; Mehran & Rosenberg, 2008), we controlled for the potential effect 
of CEO stock awards (CEO_AWARD) on bank risk variables. We collected CG and board 
characteristics data from BoardEx, Bloomberg, and SEC filings. 
3.3. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for all variables used in the analysis. Detailed 
definitions, along with the data sources of the study’s variables, are provided in Appendix A. 
First, the mean values of NPA and Z-SCORE were -3.888 and 3.894, respectively. Compared 
with Elyasiani and Zhang (2015), the average Z-SCORE was unchanged over time despite the 
severe consequences of the crisis. The mean value of TIER-1 was 13.638%, revealing that, on 
average, banks have a comfortable buffer as their Tier 1 capital ratio exceeds the Basel 
minimum requirementsiii. Regarding the first centrality measure, the average number of banks 
that a bank was connected with through their director direct communications with the same 
third parties (DEGREE) was five. Regarding the second centrality measure, on average, 31 
banks could be reached in two steps (REACH). Finally, the average number of times that a 
bank could be an actor on the shortest path connecting two other banks (BETWEEN) was 
approximately 92. In the presence of the Interlocks Act, the mean centrality measures of our 
sample confirmed Lang and Lockhart’s (1990) findings and Baccini and Marroni’s (2016) 
argument and highlight the importance of third parties in facilitating direct communications 
among bank directors.  
The average size of the commercial banks (SIZE) was $53.693 billion. The market-to-
book ratio (PROFIT) was, on average, 10.4%, while the average stock volatility (VOLATILITY) 
was 3.458%. The table also shows that the mean leverage (LEVERAGE) was 89.5%, and the 
mean deposit to liabilities ratio (DEPOSITS) was 88.2%, indicating that banks, unlike non-
financial companies, are highly leveraged and depend heavily on deposits as the principal 
source of funding. Moreover, the mean bank loan (LOANS) was 64.2% relative to total assets, 
with an average cost efficiency (EFFICIENCY) of 66.5%. 
Regarding board characteristics, the commercial banks had, on average, 11 directors on 
their boards (BOARD SIZE). Thus, the average board size of the commercial banks was smaller 
than that (i.e., 14 directors approximately) reported by Elyasiani and Zhang (2015) for US bank 
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holding companies over the period of 2001–2010. This difference in size suggests that US 
commercial banks have recently tended to reduce their board size. Board independence 
(INDEPEND) was, on average, approximately 82%. Women’s representation on boards 
(WOMEN) was, on average, 12%. The mean board age (AGE) was approximately 63 years, 
and 12% of board members, on average, held an accounting, finance, and/or banking certificate 
(EDU_EXPERT). 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Table 2 presents the properties of the indirect interlock network among the US 
commercial banks over the period of the study. The number of network sub-groups with a 
minimum of two connected banks decreased from two in 2010 to one in 2012 but then increased 
to four in 2014. The size of the largest network sub-group increased consistently from 124 
banks in 2010 to 137 banks in 2014. This latter increase explained the notable increase in the 
number of ties from 758 in 2010 to 1066 in 2014. Additionally, the actual number of ties 
relative to the total number of possible ties in the network gradually increased from 0.027 in 
2010 to 0.038 in 2014, implying that the banking network density had increased over the years. 
The finding may also explain the reduction in the average distance between banks from 3.085 
in 2010 to 2.817 in 2014. Table 2 also presents a fragmentation measure, reflecting the 
proportion of banks that cannot reach other. The table shows a significant decrease in the 
fragmentation from 45.6% in 2010 to 36.6% in 2014, indicating that banks tend to reduce the 
social and physical distance between them by establishing more connections. The lowest value 
of fragmentation, which emerged in 2012, can be explained by the highest value of BETWEEN, 
which was 102.906 in 2012; in comparison, in 2010 and 2014, the values of BETWEEN were 
82.266 and 89.733, respectively. Not surprisingly, the number of isolated banks significantly 
decreased from 42 in 2010 to 25 in 2014. The very existence of indirect interlocks among US 
banks over years contradicts Hernandez, Sanders, and Tuschke’s (2015) findings that German 
companies tend to terminate their direct interlocks with companies that facilitate connections 
with competitors to prevent leakage of strategic knowledge, revealing that US banks are keen 
to extensively benefit from the direct interlocks with third parties to establish interbank 
networks. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
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Table 3 shows the average well-connectedness of the ten largest banks in the sample. All 
the centrality measures of these ten banks are larger than the average centrality measures of the 
whole sample. Bank of New York Mellon Corporation (Bank of New York Mellon) and Bank 
of America Corporation (Bank of America) exhibit the highest average DEGREE, REACH, 
and BETWEEN over the period of the study. JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPMorgan), the largest 
bank in the sample, interestingly has the lowest average DEGREE and REACH among the ten 
largest banks. However, because JPMorgan is a well-established bank, its well-connectedness 
with other banks may still plays an important role in its board governance, complementing its 
other governance strategies. Table 3 also shows that State Street Corporation has the lowest 
average BETWEEN among the ten largest banks. The results reported in Table 3 broadly signify 
the essence of the well-connectedness, formed through multiple indirect interlocks (IDIs), 
among bank boardrooms. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Using NetDraw software for network visualisation (Borgatti, 2002), Figs. 4, 5, and 6 
show visualisations for the connections among banks in 2010, 2012, and 2014, respectively. 
The shapes (circles, squares, triangles, upside-down triangles, and boxes) in each figure 
represent the network sub-groups. Consistent with the results reported in Table 2, Fig. 5 shows 
that 2012 has only two shapes (i.e., circles for the connected banks and squares for the isolated 
banks), while 2010 and 2014 have three and five shapes, respectively. In other words, while 
2012 has one network sub-group, 2010 and 2014 have two and four network sub-groups, 
respectively. The high average betweenness centrality in 2012, which was the highest average 
of all three years, can explain the singular sub-group in 2012’s network. Namely, high 
betweenness centrality increases the connectedness among banks, reduces the distance among 
unconnected banks, and contributes to eliminating the possibility of isolated banks. 
The size of each bank (i.e., node) in the networks represents the DEGREE of the bank. 
Hence, the larger is the size of the node, the higher is the degree value of that nodeiv. Consistent 
with Table 3, Bank of New York Mellon in each of the three figures has the largest node over 
the three years, confirming that it has the largest DEGREE. Finally, the node’s colour reflects 
the k-core (sub-graph) to which the node belongs. According to Larsen and Ellersgaard (2017, 
p. 60), “K-cores are a central subcomponent within which all individuals have the highest 
possible numbers of internal ties. Each individual is assigned a coreness score corresponding 
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to the minimum degree of individuals they are connected to”. Figs. 4, 5, and 6 show that the 
number of the sub-component increased from seven in 2010 to ten in 2014. 
[Insert Fig. 4 here] 
[Insert Fig. 5 here] 
[Insert Fig. 6 here] 
Table 4 shows the correlation among BFS variables, bank centrality measures, and 
controls for the 168 US commercial listed banks for 2010, 2012, and 2014. Spearman non-
parametric (Pearson) correlation coefficients are in the upper (lower) triangle. A correlation 
coefficient of 0.80 or more indicates high collinearity among variables, thus econometric 
problems (Akbar et al., 2017; Gujarati, 2003). As expected, the correlation coefficients 
(Pearson and Spearman) for all three centrality measures exceeded 0.80; hence, the measures 
were highly correlated. Avoiding the potential multicollinearity problem then requires 
examining the impact of each centrality measure separately in different models. After applying 
different models for each centrality measure, the untabulated results of variance inflation 
factors (VIF) confirmed the absence of multicollinearity among the regressors in all models. 
Table 4 also reports a significant negative correlation between the three centrality 
measures and NPA and TIER-1 and a significant positive association with Z-SCORE. This 
result suggests that the well-connected banks can effectively reduce credit risk and insolvency 
risk but that they exhibit high capital risk. Additionally, the three centrality measures correlate 
significantly and positively with LOGSIZE, INDEPEND, WOMEN, and CEO_AWARD, but 
negatively with VOLATILITY, LEVERAGE, LOANS, DEPOSITS, and DIVIDEND. First, this 
finding implies that well-connected banks tend to be larger and have higher percentages of 
independent directors and women on their boards. Moreover, it implies that well-connected 
banks experience less stock price volatility and are more oriented towards issuing stock awards 
to their CEOs but not towards issuing dividends to the shareholders. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
3.4. Research design 
Endogeneity is a highly prevalent problem in most corporate finance and CG research (Akbar 
et al., 2017; Bhagat et al., 2015; Elyasiani & Zhang, 2015; Okazaki & Sawada, 2011; Palvia et 
al., 2015). The unobservable heterogeneity problem is mitigated by controlling for the effect 
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of director educational and financial background. The possibility that bank risk variables may 
be determined simultaneously with bank well-connectedness (i.e., the reverse causality 
problem) is considered next. This potential problem constitutes the main source of the 
endogeneity that could drive the relationship between BFS variables and centrality measures. 
For example, banks with high-risk exposures tend to appoint directors with many indirect 
connections with other bank directors to benefit from director relevant knowledge, skills, and 
expertise (Homroy & Slechten, 2017) and/or from the possibility of getting rare and valuable 
information from competitors (Ingram & Roberts, 2000; Okazaki & Sawada, 2011). 
Based on these perspectives, we conducted Hausman’s (1978) endogeneity test between 
the bank risk variables and centrality variables along with the other relevant tests to address 
and control the potential endogeneity issue. Tables 5, 6, and 7 show small p-values of the 
Hausman’s endogeneity test. These p-values reject the exogeneity of the centrality measures, 
confirming that standard econometric tools such as the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator 
cannot be applied to account for the endogeneity problem. Moreover, because the changes in 
the board composition are not significant over time (Baselga-Pascual et al., 2018), applying the 
difference-in-differences (Arellano & Bover, 1995) and generalised method of moments 
(GMM) (Blundell & Bond, 1998) estimation techniques would not be feasible in our case to 
mitigate the endogeneity problem. We only have one potential endogenous variable—i.e., the 
bank well-connectedness variable—in each model. Our models, therefore, would require at 
most one valid instrumental variable, unlike Baselga-Pascual et al.’s (2018) models, which 
have seven potentially endogenous variables. Accordingly, applying the identification strategy 
of instrumental variables (IV) to estimate the two-stage least square (2SLS) models is feasible 
in this study to alleviate the endogeneity concerns. The validity of the IV approach is 
conditioned by the extent to which the chosen instrument(s) is highly correlated with the 
endogenous variable(s) (i.e., centrality variable(s)) but not with the dependent variable(s) (i.e., 
BFS variable(s)). 
We used board size (BOARD_SIZE) as our bank-specific instrumental variable (see 
Okazaki & Sawada, 2011). The larger is the board size, the greater is the possibility that its 
directors have multiple directorships or active affiliations in many third parties. Therefore, a 
large bank board is subject to high levels of professional connections with many other bank 
directors in these third parties and, hence, likely holds a more prominent position in the 
network. Prior studies report inconclusive evidence for the relationship between bank risk and 
board size (Akbar et al., 2017; Berger et al., 2014; Elyasiani & Zhang, 2015; Talavera et al., 
2018). Thus, BOARD_SIZE is expected to have a significant positive association with the 
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centrality measures but to be uncorrelated with the error term of the second-stage regression. 
The number of banks headquartered in the state where the focal bank is headquartered 
(N_BANK) was also employed as another instrumental variable. The use of N_BANK was 
justified based on directors of banks headquartered in one state being expected to be more 
indirectly interlocked with each other. Hence, the higher is the number of banks headquartered 
in the focal bank’s state, the greater is the possibility that the focal bank is well-connected and 
central in the network (Okazaki & Sawada, 2011). Accordingly, N_BANK is expected to have 
a positive coefficient with the centrality measures but to be uncorrelated with the error term of 
the second-stage regression. Due to the theoretical plausibility that might exist among the 
instruments, this study additionally performed the following set of specification tests: the Stock 
and Yogo’s (2005) weak instrument test, Anderson-Rubin joint significance test, and Hasen-
Sargan over-identification test. These tests ensured the validity and relevance of the 
instruments. 
In the first stage of 2SLS estimation, as shown in Eq. 1, we regressed each centrality 
measure (CENT) on the two instrumental variables and all the exogenous variables to obtain 
the predicted values of each CENT. Next, these predicted values were used in a second stage 
that involves regressing BFS variables (RISK) on the predicted values of each CENT and all 





CENTit is the bank well-connectedness or centrality measures (namely, DEGREE, 
REACH, and BETWEEN). 
BOARD_SIZEit is number of directors on the bank board. 
N_BANKit is the number of banks headquartered in the state in which the focal bank is 
headquartered. 





RISKit is the bank risk variables (namely, NPA, Z-SCORE, and TIER-1). 
CENTit = β0+ β1 BOARD_SIZEit + β2 N_BANKit + ϴ Xit + εit               (1) 
 




4. Analyses and findings 
4.1. Main regression results 
Columns 1, 3, and 5 in Tables 5, 6, and 7, respectively, show the results of the first-stage 
regression of the two instruments on CENT. As predicted, BOARD_SIZE and N_BANK were 
positively and significantly correlated with CENT measures (DEGREE, REACH, and 
BETWEEN). For the tests undertaken to ensure model validity, the weak instrument test 
indicated that the instruments are not weak, but valid. Specifically, the first stage’s Kleibergen-
Paap rk Wald F statistic exceeds the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical value. The small p-values 
of the Anderson-Rubin test also demonstrated the validity of the instruments and joint 
significance of the system. Moreover, the high p-values of the Hansen J test, the over-
identification test of all instruments, did not reject the null hypothesis, confirming that the 
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and suggesting the validity of the instruments. 
4.1.1. Bank well-connectedness and credit risk (NPA) 
Columns 2, 4, and 6 in Table 5 present the results of the association between the predicted 
values of bank centrality measures (DEGREE, REACH, and BETWEEN, respectively) and bank 
credit risk (NPA). The coefficients of DEGREE, REACH, and BETWEEN on NPA were 
negative and statistically significant. The findings indicate that, for a one-standard-deviation 
increase in degree, reachability, and betweenness centrality, the credit risk falls by 
approximately 51%, 47%, and 59%, respectively. The evidence supports H1 and suggests that 
bank well-connectedness with other banks limits credit risk. 
 [Insert Table 5 here] 
4.1.2. Bank well-connectedness and insolvency risk (Z-SCORE) 
A well-connected boardroom signals a board’s endowment with highly rare, valuable, and 
relevant information, knowledge, and expertise. Thus, a well-connected boardroom may offer 
great help in controlling bank insolvency risk. As H2 predicted, Columns 2, 4, and 6 in Table 
6 report a significant positive relationship between the three centrality measures and Z-SCORE, 
revealing that the well-connected banks exhibit low insolvency risk. The results indicate that, 
for a one-standard-deviation increase in degree, reachability, and betweenness centrality, the 
insolvency risk drops by approximately 46%, 43%, and 50%, respectively. 
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[Insert Table 6 here] 
While the evidence reported by prior studies (see Hernandez et al., 2015; Pahnke et al., 
2015) identifies the moral hazard of sharing strategic and competitive information, knowledge 
and skills among competitors, our findings are consistent with evidence reported for the 
Australian hotel sector by Ingram and Roberts (2000) and for the pre-1936 Japanese financial 
sector by Okazaki and Sawada (2011), signalling the value of such leakage on company 
economic and strategic outcomes. In support of the predictions of the extended RBV, our 
findings propose that being a well-connected bank through IDIs signals the boardroom’s 
endowment with rare, valuable, and confidential information circulated by other banks 
regarding borrowers’ repayment behaviour and debt risk exposure. Ultimately, a well-
connected bank can distinctively eliminate adverse selection problems in accepting lending 
applications. Along a similar line, Brown, Jappelli, and Pagano (2009) reported that sharing 
information about borrowers between banks has a significant impact on improving the lending 
system. Our results also confirmed Elyasiani and Zhang’s (2015) argument regarding the 
uniqueness of board busyness in the US banking sector, demonstrating that banks with 
prominent positions in the banking network have privileged information access to critical risk 
mitigation strategies towards managing insolvency risk. 
In addition to the advantage of information sharing, our results lend empirical support to 
the extended RBV, revealing that the direct professional connections among bank directors 
through their directorships in the same third parties signal the accumulation of boardroom 
banking knowledge, skills and expertise. In short, the connected bank directors can, through 
shared learning, develop homogeneous beliefs and aggregate their overall board qualifications 
and competencies towards providing relevant professional advice that lowers credit risk, limits 
negative returns and reduces the chance of bankruptcy. Disseminating beliefs through IDIs 
could then create a banking culture that reduces belief heterogeneity among banks, thereby 
reducing disagreement about dealing with bank risk exposures (see Song & Thakor, 2018). 
Accordingly, our empirical evidence provides an extension to the findings of Carpenter and 
Westphal (2001) that show the beneficial impact of appointing directors who have connections 
with strategically related organisations on the board advisory role. Our findings are also 
consistent with the latest evidence reported for greenhouse gas-emitting industries by Homroy 
and Slechten (2017) regarding the positive impact of the well-connectedness among non-
executive directors with similar previous experience in environmental issues on enhancing 
corporate sustainable practices, revealing that such social connections aggregate board human 
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capital and signal a distinctive advisory role. The results are also consistent with the socialised 
theory of agency (Wiseman et al., 2012) and evidence reported by Ingram and Roberts (2000), 
suggesting that the well-connectedness among bank boardrooms signals the board ability, 
through scanning the external environment and reducing competitive uncertainties, to monitor 
the opportunistic behaviour. Taken together, the findings provide empirical support for the 
positive implications of the board networks in the US banking sector. 
4.1.3. Bank well-connectedness and capital risk (TIER-1) 
Columns 2, 4, and 6 in Table 7 present whether banks endowed with central positions in the 
banking network hold high or low capital ratios. Our results show significant negative 
coefficients of DEGREE, REACH, and BETWEEN on TIER-1, indicating that the better 
connected the bank is with other banks, the lower the bank tends to hold high equity capital. 
The results indicate that, for a one-standard-deviation increase in degree, reachability, and 
betweenness centrality, bank capitalisation decreases by approximately 54%, 51%, and 61%, 
respectively. The negative association between a bank well-connectedness and its capital 
adequacy contradicts H3. Such a negative association seems to be attributable to the confidence 
that the well-connected boardroom has in understanding better the market and in controlling 
credit and insolvency risks effectively (see Eastburn & Boland, 2015). In other words, the well-
connected bank boardroom does not have to maintain a very high capital ratio as a buffer to 
mitigate the bank’s existing risks. Another potential explanation is the herding effects where 
banks may mimic the capital structure of their connected banks (see Vithessonthi, 2014). 
Because IDIs among bank directors transfer information and practices, they are expected to 
propagate low-capitalisation strategies among the connected banks through the contagion 
effect. Holding low equity capital can then be perceived as a way to ensure conformity and 
maintain competitive parity among banks. 
According to evidence reported by Anginer, Demirguc-Kunt, Huizinga, and Ma (2016), 
Beltratti and Stulz (2012), and Minton, Taillard, and Williamson (2014), bank good CG 
reforms, as recommended by regulators, with high incentives to reduce capital equity is 
characterised as shareholder-friendly CG that maximises shareholder value but, at the same 
time, shifts risks to other stakeholders. Our findings indicate that the well-connected bank 
boardrooms signal a new model of shareholder-friendly boards compared with older ones 
described by Anginer et al. (2016), Beltratti and Stulz (2012), and Minton et al. (2014); boards 
such as these enhance the shareholder wealth by lowering bank capitalisation without shifting 
risks towards other stakeholders. Given that we emphasise the impact of bank well-
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connectedness on capital adequacy during normal times, in our case, well-connected banks still 
consider maintaining low capital equity as relatively irrelevant to their financial stability. 
Nevertheless, it is evident that tendencies towards holding low capital ratios are detrimental to 
the financial stability, especially during distress times compared with that during normal times 
(Beltratti & Stulz, 2012; Minton et al., 2014). In this respect, one can argue that well-connected 
banks fail to see the long-term negative by-product of lowering bank capitalisation. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
Columns 2, 4, and 6 in Tables 5, 6, and 7, respectively, also show the impact of bank-
specific characteristics, as well as board structural and compositional characteristics, on BFS 
variables. These impacts suggest some interesting associations. In particular, bank size 
(LOGSIZE) was shown to have a significant impact on increasing bank credit risk (NPA) and 
insolvency risk (Z-SCORE). Theoretically, a positive (negative) coefficient of the LOGSIZE 
on the NPA (Z-SCORE) is consistent with an unstable banking hypothesis, a too-big-to-fail 
hypothesis, and agency theory, indicating that large banks tend to undertake riskier decisions. 
Consistent with the findings reported by Bhagat et al. (2015), Elyasiani and Zhang (2015), and 
Saghi-Zedek and Tarazi (2015), the positive association between the bank size and risk seems 
to be attributable to the high tendencies of large banks to adopt risky loan strategies that can 
lead to high spreads (rent). However, our results do not show a significant association of bank 
size and bank adherence with the regulatory capital requirement. We also report, in line with 
Elyasiani and Zhang (2015), that VOLATILITY has a negative impact on BFS by increasing the 
bank credit risk, insolvency risk, and capital risk. The positive coefficient of VOLATILITY 
suggests that risky decisions could affect different dimensions of the banking system and lead 
different types of bank risk exposures to increase together (Elyasiani & Zhang, 2015). 
Interestingly, we found a positive (negative) relationship between the bank EFFICIENCY 
and NPA (Z-SCORE). According to the skimping hypothesis proposed by Berger and DeYoung 
(1997), a possible reason for the negative association between bank cost efficiency and risk is 
that banks may neglect loan quality or fail to maintain bank solvency to maximise cost 
efficiency (Louati et al., 2016; Louzis, Vouldis, & Metaxas, 2012). We also report evidence 
that the bank low liquidity (LOANS) has a significant negative impact on bank adherence to 
capital regulation. Based on the “financial fragility structure” effect, the negative association 
between the LOANS and TIER-1 may indicate that banks that aim to attract more depositors 
and grant more loans (illiquid asset) adhere less to hold high capital ratios (Berger et al., 2009; 
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Distinguin, Roulet, & Tarazi, 2013). Moreover, the results showed that banks with high credit 
risk are more likely to hold high equity capital, suggesting that banks increase their equity 
capital as a cushion strategy to mitigate credit risk (Berger et al., 2009). 
Regarding the CG control variables, consistent with findings reported by Elyasiani and 
Zhang (2015), we found that a high fraction of independent directors on the bank board is 
associated with a high risk of insolvency. This positive association can be explained by the 
moral hazard problem proposed by Pathan (2009), suggesting that shareholder incentives for 
excessive risk-taking impose performance pressures and encourage independent directors to 
undertake risky decisions. Additionally, our findings present that a high percentage of women 
on the board (WOMEN) has a significant negative relationship with NPA and TIER-1, revealing 
that women are more risk-averse and have more incentives to reduce bank risks (Palvia et al., 
2015). Additionally, the significant negative coefficient of EDU_EXPERT on NPA suggests 
that directors holding accounting, finance, and/or banking certificates are more skilful and 
well-educated in applying efficient techniques for credit risk management. Furthermore, 
consistent with agency theory, CEO_AWARD has a negative impact on bank credit risk and 
insolvency risk, indicating that equity-based compensation is a successful means to motivate 
CEOs to mind their interests as owners and hence eliminate risks (Bouslah et al., 2018; Mehran 
& Rosenberg, 2008). Nevertheless, CEO_AWARD seems to have no significant impact on 
capital risk. 
4.2. Additional analysis and robustness tests 
Prior literature (see Anginer et al., 2016; Okazaki & Sawada, 2011; Palvia et al., 2015) has 
highlighted the importance of examining the impact of the CG mechanism’s lagged data, 
particularly that of board characteristics, on bank accounting and financial data. Two main 
reasons were noted. First, instead of emphasising the contemporaneous effect of the board 
characteristics, lagged data capture the persistence and consistency implications of the one-
year lagged values of the board structure on bank performance and/or risk. Second, using one-
year lagged values further mitigates any endogeneity concerns that are generated by the reverse 
causality. Hence, the current research examined whether bank well-connectedness has a 
persistent and consistent impact on the following year’s bank risk exposures. In doing so, we 
regressed the dependent variables of 2011, 2013, and 2015 against the independent variables 
and controls of 2010, 2012, and 2014, respectively. The second-stage results reported in Table 
8 show that bank well-connectedness with other banks, measured by DEGREE centrality, has 
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a significant persistent and consistent effect on the following year’s BFS variablesv. The 
findings suggest that bank well-connectedness with other banks provides a sustainable 
advantage to manage bank credit and insolvency risks effectively and a source of confidence 
or herd behaviour to continuously act as a shareholder-friendly board during the following year. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
Bank capital represents the cushion that reflects bank willingness to undertake risks 
(Bushman, Hendricks, & Williams, 2016). Accordingly, the negative association between bank 
well-connectedness and capital adequacy may suggest that our results are driven by bank 
regulatory pressures rather than the interbank networks. Specifically, because well-connected 
banks have tendencies towards lowering capital adequacy, they do not have a sufficient buffer 
that would undertake riskier profiles. Accordingly, it can be argued that well-connected banks 
cannot take on high risks, particularly credit and insolvency risks, because they are not already 
well-capitalised. To address this concern, following Ben-David, Palvia, and Spatt (2017), we 
reran our analyses after excluding banks whose Tier 1 risk-based capital does not “far exceed 
what the regulations define as well-capitalised ([two] percentage points higher than the 
minimum)” (D'Erasmo, 2018, p. 2). According to Basel III’s Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) 
categories issued by the FDIC (2018), the well-capitalised category is 8% Tier 1 risk-based 
capital. We found that approximately 5% of banks were not very well-capitalised over the 
sample period (i.e., hold Tier 1 risk-based capital less than 10%), suggesting that most of the 
banks in the sample already had precautionary motives and a sufficient capital buffer to 
undertake riskier decisions (D'Erasmo, 2018). The results showed that, after excluding these 
few banks, neither the direction nor the statistical significance of the main effect in Tables 5 
and 6 is changed, suggesting that regulatory pressures do not drive our main results (Tables 
with detailed results are available on request)vi. 
5. Discussion 
5.1. Theoretical, practical and policy implications 
Because our findings indicate that interbank networks have a positive impact on reducing bank 
risk exposures (i.e., credit and insolvency risks), these results have theoretical implications on 
the extended RBV, revealing a creation of internal value in the form of board social capital 
from the external connections among bank directors. Our findings suggest that being 
professionally well-connected with competitors through indirect interlocks, particularly in a 
 27 
setting that prevents any direct interlocks between competitors, offers both benefits of 
aggregating board human capital with relevant knowledge and skill and advantages of trust and 
exchanging rare, confidential and related information among competitor boardrooms. 
Accordingly, this study further extends the extended RBV by proposing professional 
communications among competitors as a resource that leverages board quality. In some 
respects, this resource may provide a source of confidence or herd behaviour that could cause 
well-connected banks to fail to see a low-capitalisation strategy as irrational or overly risky. 
By emphasising the interbank networks, our conceptual framework enables us to investigate 
the extent to which US banks can benefit from their well-connectedness. 
In the context of the banks, our findings contribute to corporate governance literature by 
linking the effect of the US interbank networks on the bank financial stability with the 
contribution of Lang and Lockhart (1990) and John et al.’s (2016) call for further research that 
may consider the role of board networks in the banking sector. For those banking studies that 
have continuously counted the number of director interlocks, adopting a decomposition 
approach for director interlocks helps to counter the myth regarding the actual role of board 
social capital in the banking sector. The finding that indirect interlocks among bank directors, 
as a unique board social capital, has a significant impact on bank financial stability fills the gap 
of the under-investigated area of research regarding the implications of the professional 
connections among US competitors through indirect interlocks. Therefore, our empirical 
evidence contends the importance of the relationships among competitors to a highly regulated 
sector such as the banking sector in dealing with common risks and potential hazards. 
This study also offers some policy implications for bank directors and the Interlocks Act. 
We contend that bank directors make good use of their well-connectedness in the third parties 
to meet their fiduciary obligations conscientiously, thus restoring the trust of various 
stakeholder groups. For depositors, borrowers and regulators, we show that a well-connected 
boardroom is a unique resource that manages credit and insolvency risks effectively. For 
investors, shareholders of a well-connected bank are better off because well-connected banks 
have no tendencies to maintain high capital ratios. Hence, banks with well-connected 
boardrooms attempt to reach an optimal point in which the shareholder value is maximised 
while minding the well-being of other stakeholders (Srivastav & Hagendorff, 2016). Regarding 
US regulators, as policy assessments tend to ignore the implications of the professional 
communications among bank directors, our evidence suggests that policymakers need to 
further improve the Interlocks Act and bank governance reforms to fully achieve their intended 
goals. 
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5.2. Limitations and suggestions for future research 
As with all research efforts, this study possesses some limitations. Our study used archival data. 
Therefore, we recommend that future studies conduct in-depth interviews to offer useful 
insights into the type and timing of information circulated among bank directors and how such 
communications aggregate their banking competencies. While our sample covers the post-
crisis period to examine the impact of interbank networks on bank financial stability under 
normal economic conditions, future studies should explore the impact of interbank connections 
during the banking financial crisis. Future studies should also frame the case over a 
complete business cycle to provide more consistent insights into the longer-term perspective. 
This study focused on bank financial stability. We recommend that future studies explore the 
association between interbank networks and accounting quality, hedging strategies, 
community impact and environmental responsibility, and merger and acquisition activity. Our 
study was limited to US banks due to the scope of the Interlocks Act so that our findings are 
not generalisable outside the US context or to non-banking sectors. Therefore, we recommend 
that future studies analyse the implications of professional communication among directors of 
competing companies in less well-regulated industries as well as in countries with different 
legal governance.  
6. Conclusion 
In the contemporary context of an interconnected environment, prohibiting competitors from 
constructing social and professional connections is no longer effective. In this study, we 
investigate the structure and implications of the professional connections among bank 
directors. By constructing an up-to-date unique dataset of director biographies for 168 US 
commercial banks, we demonstrate that prohibitions set out in the Interlocks Act have been 
circumvented by the establishment of indirect interlocks that allow for mass professional 
connections among bank directors. Using empirical evidence, we are the first to reveal, after 
controlling for endogeneity, that banks with well-connected boards present low credit and 
insolvency risks and that their boards do not have to maintain a very high capital ratio as a 
cushion to alleviate the bank existing risks. Using the extended RBV, our study demonstrates 
that bank well-connectedness signals board social capital that enhances board ability to fairly 
represent various stakeholder interests and to act in a shareholder-friendly manner that 
maximises shareholder wealth. Hence, professional connections among US commercial banks 
are a crucial determinant of bank financial stability. 
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Notes: The figure illustrates direct interlocks among competitors that are prohibited under the US antitrust laws, and how indirect interlocks can be formed between competitors. BOD 
represents board of directors. Gov. represents governmental organisations. NPO represents nonprofit organisations. 
 37 
Fig. 3. 
























































UCINET software is utilised to 
make transformations  
 
Construct for each bank a list of 
director names during the sample 
period including information about 
positions and tenure of the 168 bank 
directors 
A comprehensive dataset, for the 
years 2010, 2012, and 2014, is 
constructed for all banks. 
This dataset contains information 
only about the current positions and 
tenure of the bank directors in third 
parties, host non-bank listed 
companies, governmental 
organisations, and other nonprofit 
organisations, such as universities, 
charities, medical institutions, and 
other nonprofit organisations. 
As illustrated before in Fig. 1, under 
the Interlocks Act, a director of two 
banks can be possibly connected if 
affiliated with and/or holds a seat on 
the board of a third party (i.e., a host 
organisation). 
Using the constructed dataset, undirected binary two-mode affiliation matrices (see Davis et 
al., 2003; Tutzauer, 2013) are initially formed for 2010, 2012 and 2014. For each year matrix, 
• Rows represent the list of the directors of the 168 banks (actors) who actively hold 
executive or non-executive positions on the bank boards. 
• Columns represent the third parties (events) in which bank directors are actively affiliated. 
The focal bank directors and their affiliations in the third parties are included in the matrices if 
the bank director has held directorship or affiliation for 30% or more of the bank’s or the other 
affiliation’s fiscal year (i.e., has been in the organisation three months before the end of its fiscal 
year). 
Two-mode affiliation matrices for each year are transformed into one-mode undirected valued 
adjacency matrices to show all the possible indirect interlocks between bank directors through 
being actively affiliated with the same third parties1. 
 
For each year matrix, each individual bank director is an actor, and two directors i and j are 
connected if they actively sit on or are involved in board k in time t. 
An aggregation (i.e., cohesion 
or density by group) is made 
for the three years matrices to 
form bank-level matrices 
 
Valued adjacency bank-level matrices are formed to measure all the possible 
connections among banks (actors) through their director active affiliation with 
the same third parties (events). 
 
The valued matrices are then dichotomised to reflect the professional 
connection between two banks as a dummy variable that takes a value of one 
if at least one director of a bank is currently connected to at least one director 
of another bank and zero otherwise. 
1An adjacency matrix is a squared matrix that has an equal number of rows and columns reflecting the unit of analysis (i.e., bank directors or banks). The one-mode adjacency matrix can be either binary or 
valued. The cell of the binary adjacency matrix takes a value of one if there is at least a common relationship between two directors or banks and zero otherwise. However, the cell in the valued adjacency 



















                                                            
1 Fig. 4 should be printed in colour. 
2 Fig. 5 should be printed in colour. 
Notes: The figure shows the indirect interlock network among the 168 US commercial banks in 2010. The shapes (i.e., circles, squares, and triangles) represent the network sub-groups. 
The size of each bank (i.e., node) in the network represents the DEGREE centrality of the bank. The node’s colour reflects the k-core (sub-graph) that the node belongs to. Bank name 
is shown for the ten largest banks in the sample. 
  
Notes: The figure shows the indirect interlock network among the 168 US commercial banks in 2012. The shapes (i.e., circles and squares) represent the network sub-groups. The size 
of each bank (i.e., node) in the network represents the DEGREE centrality of the bank. The node’s colour reflects the k-core (sub-graph) that the bank belongs to. Bank name is shown 









































                                                            
3 Fig. 6 should be printed in colour. 
Notes: The figure shows the indirect interlock network among the 168 US commercial banks in 2014. The shapes (i.e., circles, squares, triangles, upside-down triangles, and boxes) 
represent the network sub-groups. The size of each bank (i.e., node) in the network represents the DEGREE centrality of the bank. The node’s colour reflects the k-core (sub-graph) 




Descriptive statistics of all variables for all (504) bank-years. 
 Mean Median SD Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
NPA -3.888 -3.895 0.951 -7.310 0.000 -0.082 4.166 
Z-SCORE 3.894 4.054 1.365 -0.176 7.892 -0.413 3.237 
TIER-1 13.638 13.360 2.639 6.810 21.280 0.664 3.700 
DEGREE 5.149 3.000 5.337 0.000 19.000 1.218 3.626 
REACH 31.464 27.500 28.175 0.000 116.000 0.696 2.598 
BETWEEN 91.635 12.206 146.100 0.000 499.325 1.754 4.925 
INDEPEND 0.821 0.846 0.096 0.500 1.000 -0.956 3.290 
AGE 62.507 62.333 3.604 47.620 77.860 0.427 4.784 
WOMEN 0.116 0.100 0.091 0.000 0.400 0.544 2.849 
EDU_EXPERT 0.123 0.111 0.096 0.000 0.333 0.497 2.459 
SIZE (US$ in billion) 53.694 3.397 273.665 0.402 257.313 7.317 57.788 
LOGSIZE 8.391 8.131 1.476 6.450 11.986 0.902 3.162 
PROFIT 0.104 0.126 0.345 -0.747 0.706 -0.396 2.845 
VOLATILITY 3.458 3.347 0.394 2.956 4.543 0.941 3.274 
DELTA 0.040 0.032 0.098 -0.168 0.230 0.046 2.787 
LEVERAGE 0.895 0.896 0.019 0.859 0.930 -0.090 2.230 
CEO_AWARD 0.083 0.116 0.063 0.000 0.167 -0.476 1.401 
LOANS 0.642 0.650 0.104 0.400 0.799 -0.671 2.923 
DEPOSITS 0.882 0.893 0.062 0.744 0.972 -0.583 2.473 
EFFICIENCY 0.665 0.657 0.116 0.469 0.958 0.556 3.199 
DIVIDEND 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.000 0.062 0.641 2.394 
BOARD_SIZE 2.412 2.398 0.237 1.946 2.833 -0.199 2.389 
BOARD SIZE 11.488 11.000 2.819 5.000 21.000 0.391 3.015 
N_BANK 20.617 14.000 16.049 1.000 57.000 0.818 2.491 
Notes: The table presents the descriptive statistics for the 168 US publicly listed national and state commercial banks for 2010, 2012, and 2014. NPA represents credit risk. Z-SCORE 
represents insolvency risk. TIER-1 represents capital risk. DEGREE represents the focal bank first-degree connections. REACH represents the number of banks in the sample that the 
focal bank can reach in two steps. BETWEEN represents the number of the shortest paths linking any two banks in the network that pass through the focal bank. INDEPEND represents 
board independence. AGE represents board average age. WOMEN represents percentage of women directors on the board. EDU_EXPERT represents the percentage of directors with 
relevant educational background and financial experience. SIZE represents bank total assets. LOGSIZE represents the natural logarithm of bank total assets. PROFIT represents market 
to book ratio. VOLATILITY represents bank risk. DELTA represents CEO pay-performance sensitivity. CEO_AWARD represents CEO stock award. LOANS represents bank liquidity. 
DEPOSITS represents bank funding. EFFICIENCY represents bank cost efficiency. DIVIDEND represents dividend payout. BOARD_SIZE represents the natural logarithm of the 
number of directors on the board. BOARD SIZE represents the number of directors on the board. N_BANK represents the number of banks headquartered in the state where the focal 
bank is headquartered. All variables are defined with their data sources in Appendix A. 
 
Table 2 
Structure of the indirect interlock network among the US commercial banks by year. 
 2010 2012 2014 
Number of banks 168 168 168 
DEGREE 4.399 4.964 6.083 
REACH 25.786 29.595 39.012 
BETWEEN 82.266 102.906 89.733 
Isolated banks 42.000 30.000 25.000 
Sub-groups (minimum 2 linked banks) 2.000 1.000 4.000 
Number of banks in the largest sub-group 124.000 138.000 137.000 
Number of cores (sub-components) 6.000 8.000 9.000 
Number of ties  758.000 866.000 1066.000 
Density 0.027 0.031 0.038 
Avg. distance 3.085 3.182 2.817 
Fragmentation 0.456 0.326 0.336 
Notes: The table presents the properties of the indirect interlock network among US commercial banks in 2010, 2012, and 2014. DEGREE represents the number of banks that the focal 
bank is connected with through their director indirect interlocks in the same third parties. REACH represents the number of banks in the sample that the focal bank can reach in two 
steps. BETWEEN represents the number of the shortest paths linking any two banks in the network that pass through the focal bank. Isolated banks is the number of banks that are not 
connected. Sub-groups represents the number of groups in which at least two banks are connected. Number of cores represents subcomponents within which all individuals have the 
highest possible numbers of internal ties. Density represents the total number of actual ties over the total number of possible ties. Avg. distance represents the average length of the 
shortest path between two nodes or banks. Fragmentation represents the proportion of banks that cannot reach other. 
 
Table 3 
Average well-connectedness of the ten largest banks. 
 Total Assets (US$ in Billion) DEGREE REACH BETWEEN 
JPMorgan Chase & Co. 2349.957 10.667 67.000 320.171 
Bank of America Corporation 2193.139 23.667 101.000 810.629 
Wells Fargo & Company (recently WFC Holdings Corporation) 1456.084 22.000 91.333 630.527 
US Bancorp 354.723 17.667 79.333 597.458 
Bank of New York Mellon Corporation 330.517 29.000 102.667 1370.321 
PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. 304.821 22.000 95.667 629.286 
State Street Corporation 219.069 17.333 86.667 283.724 
Suntrust Banks Inc. 178.881 20.000 89.667 465.685 
BB&T Corporation 175.922 18.333 88.333 802.858 
Fifth Third Bancorp 123.869 15.333 77.667 462.930 
Notes: The table presents the average well-connectedness of the ten largest banks in the sample for 2010, 2012, and 2014. DEGREE represents the number of banks that the focal bank 
is connected with through their director indirect interlocks in the same third parties. REACH represents the number of banks in the sample that the focal bank can reach in two steps. 




Pearson-Spearman correlation matrix of all variables for all (504) bank-years. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
1) NPA  -0.457c 0.129c -0.231c -0.252c -0.196c -0.133c -0.038 -0.273c -0.138c -0.268c -0.477c 0.590c -0.070 0.140c -0.326c -0.022 0.051 0.275c -0.368c -0.187c -0.036 
2) Z-SCORE -0.401c  0.019 0.110b 0.121c 0.080a 0.056 0.067 0.107b 0.024 0.106b 0.268c -0.517c 0.013 -0.167c 0.164c -0.091b -0.057 -0.326c 0.518c 0.125c 0.045 
3) TIER-1 0.090b 0.062  -0.175c -0.181c -0.224c -0.084a 0.043 -0.061 0.080a -0.198c 0.004 -0.014 -0.056 -0.370c -0.184c -0.359c 0.108b -0.015 0.099b -0.219c -0.048 
4) DEGREE -0.173c 0.092c -0.154c  0.955c 0.885c 0.221c 0.028 0.339c -0.243c 0.525c 0.081a -0.258c 0.074a -0.108b 0.469c -0.087a -0.171c 0.009 0.049 0.454c 0.015 
5) REACH -0.215c 0.122c -0.158c 0.938c  0.838c 0.228c 0.044 0.362c -0.222c 0.558c 0.116c -0.294c 0.089b -0.112b 0.501c -0.065 -0.166c 0.034 0.055 0.458c 0.023 
6) BETWEEN -0.100b 0.053 -0.171c 0.873c 0.768c  0.202c 0.016 0.316c -0.264c 0.537c 0.075a -0.244c 0.094b -0.087a 0.468c -0.054 -0.188c -0.007 0.071 0.437c 0.020 
7) INDEPEND -0.075a 0.012 -0.035 0.207c 0.212c 0.139c  -0.025 0.212c -0.072 0.150c 0.012 -0.096b -0.026 -0.165c 0.241c -0.072 -0.070 -0.037 0.004 0.057 0.098b 
8) AGE -0.016 0.081a 0.078a 0.000 0.001 0.004 -0.008  -0.016 -0.138c 0.038 0.050 -0.110b -0.012 -0.125c -0.082a -0.004 0.124c -0.048 0.070 0.049 0.129c 
9) WOMEN -0.272c 0.120c -0.030 0.337c 0.364c 0.277c 0.193c -0.031  -0.045 0.375c 0.151c -0.253c 0.028 -0.108b 0.374c -0.070 -0.199c -0.117c 0.197c 0.193c -0.154c 
10) EDU_EXPERT -0.170c 0.043 0.080a -0.236c -0.221c -0.239c -0.072 -0.115c -0.076a  -0.108b 0.017 -0.052 0.063 -0.044 -0.097b 0.082a 0.043 0.016 -0.007 -0.134c 0.025 
11) LOGSIZE -0.211c 0.107b -0.180c 0.669c 0.677c 0.635c 0.147c 0.016 0.408c -0.152c  0.341c -0.437c 0.097b -0.243c 0.648c -0.182c -0.260c -0.214c 0.184c 0.419c -0.132c 
12) PROFIT -0.440c 0.270c 0.028 0.081a 0.123c 0.025 -0.001 0.058 0.176c 0.030 0.264c  -0.480c 0.093b -0.007 0.226c -0.079a -0.027 -0.447c 0.466c 0.103b -0.059 
13) VOLATILITY 0.540c -0.533c -0.087a -0.243c -0.293c -0.187c -0.033 -0.132c -0.256c -0.064 -0.395c -0.535c  -0.088b 0.270c -0.356c 0.120c 0.030 0.262c -0.481c -0.219c 0.027 
14) DELTA -0.061 0.016 -0.020 0.056 0.072 0.065 0.007 -0.021 0.045 0.057 0.085a 0.100b -0.091b  -0.022 0.268c 0.088b -0.034 -0.015 0.050 0.093b -0.056 
15) LEVERAGE 0.131c -0.204c -0.415c -0.111b -0.110b -0.085a -0.126c -0.121c -0.124c -0.048 -0.210c -0.056 0.315c 0.005  -0.203c 0.046 -0.125c 0.196c -0.133c -0.041 -0.056 
16) CEO_AWARD -0.287c 0.154c -0.163c 0.358c 0.394c 0.310c 0.193c -0.142c 0.339c -0.061 0.495c 0.239c -0.310c 0.257c -0.166c  -0.062 -0.170c -0.049 0.110b 0.289c -0.094b 
17) LOANS 0.008 -0.097b -0.304c -0.195c -0.159c -0.182c -0.042 -0.064 -0.067 0.090b -0.288c -0.123c 0.159c 0.057 0.027 -0.040  0.174c 0.031 -0.187c 0.005 0.052 
18) DEPOSITS 0.048 -0.065 0.081a -0.231c -0.204c -0.253c -0.031 0.108b -0.221c 0.061 -0.340c -0.027 0.034 -0.046 -0.109b -0.091b 0.199c  0.096b -0.133c -0.138c 0.142c 
19) EFFICIENCY 0.311c -0.420c -0.079a -0.013 0.022 -0.036 -0.015 -0.076a -0.133c 0.018 -0.169c -0.429c 0.366c -0.030 0.214c -0.040 0.055 0.092b  -0.432c -0.033 -0.063 
20) DIVIDEND -0.298c 0.485c 0.135c -0.019 -0.007 -0.006 -0.029 0.094b 0.151c 0.011 0.067 0.491c -0.454c 0.020 -0.085a 0.070 -0.183c -0.109b -0.442c  0.187c -0.054 
21) BOARD_SIZE -0.152c 0.143c -0.200c 0.406c 0.430c 0.375c 0.007 -0.044 0.213c -0.147c 0.406c 0.096b -0.216c 0.093b -0.031 0.259c -0.038 -0.139c -0.061 0.162c  -0.093b 
22) N_BANK -0.046 0.033 0.000 0.051 0.051 0.044 0.104b 0.207c -0.111b 0.025 -0.089b -0.013 0.010 -0.056 -0.088b -0.121c 0.025 0.155c -0.059 -0.034 -0.139c  
Notes: The table presents the correlation coefficients among the main regression variables for the 168 US publicly listed national and state commercial banks for 2010, 2012, and 2014. The bottom half of the table displays Person’s parametric correlation coefficients, whereas the upper 





Bank well-connectedness and credit risk (NPA). 
 
Dependent variable: NPA 
 


































DEGREEt  -0.090*** 
(0.003) 
    
REACHt 
 
   -0.016*** 
(0.002) 
  
BETWEENt      -0.004*** 
(0.006) 








































































































































































Year fixed effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 504 504 504 504 504 504 
First-stage F-statistics (Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F-
statistics) 
22.82  31.15  13.63  
Cragg–Donald statistic for weak instruments based on 
the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical value 
20.57  26.30  13.30  
Strong instruments Yes  Yes  Yes  
Anderson-Rubin (p-value)  0.009  0.009  0.009 
Hansen J   0.057  0.094  0.005 
Hansen J (p-value)  0.812  0.759  0.943 
Hausman’s endegoneity test  (p-value)  0.008  0.011  0.004 








Notes: The table presents the two-stage least squares (2SLS) IV regressions to estimate Eq. 1 and Eq. 2 in the relationship between bank well-connectedness and credit risk. All variables 
are defined in Appendix A. Columns 1, 3, and 5 present the first-stage (Eq. 1) in which instruments, namely, BOARD_SIZE and N_BANK, are used to obtain the predicted values of 
each centrality measure, namely, DEGREE, REACH, and BETWEEN, respectively. Columns 2, 4, and 6 present the estimation of the second-stage analysis (Eq. 2) in which the predicted 
values for each centrality measure are used to predict the relationship between each bank centrality measure and credit risk (NPA). The table provides relevant tests undertaken to ensure 
the validity of the instruments and structure model. All analyses were run with robust standard errors. Coefficients are provided with p-values below in parenthesis *, **, and *** 

















Bank well-connectedness and insolvency risk (Z-SCORE). 
 Dependent Variable: Z-SCORE  

































DEGREEt  0.118** 
(0.019) 
    
REACHt    0.021** 
(0.014) 
  






























































































































































Year fixed effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 504 504 504 504 504 504 
First-stage F-statistics (Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F-
statistics) 
19.42  26.51  11.87  
Cragg–Donald statistic for weak instruments based on the 
Stock and Yogo (2005) critical value 
18.04  22.92  12.23  
Strong instruments Yes  Yes  Yes  
Anderson-Rubin (p-value)  0.029  0.029  0.029 
Hansen J  0.974  0.898  1.371 
Hansen J (p-value)  0.324  0.343  0.242 
Hausman’s endegoneity test (p-value)  0.026  0.041  0.026 






Notes: The table presents the two-stage least squares (2SLS) IV regressions to estimate Eq. 1 and Eq. 2 in the relationship between bank well-connectedness and insolvency risk. All 
variables are defined in Appendix A. Columns 1, 3, and 5 present the first-stage (Eq. 1) in which instruments, namely, BOARD_SIZE and N_BANK, are used to obtain the predicted 
values of each centrality measure, namely, DEGREE, REACH, and BETWEEN, respectively. Columns 2, 4, and 6 present the estimation of the second-stage analysis (Eq. 2) in which 
the predicted values for each centrality measure are used to predict the relationship between each bank centrality measure and insolvency risk (Z-SCORE). The table provides relevant 
tests undertaken to ensure the validity of the instruments and structure model. All analyses were run with robust standard errors. Coefficients are provided with p-values below in 



















Bank well-connectedness and capital risk (TIER-1). 
 Dependent variable: TIER-1 
 



































DEGREEt  -0.267** 
(0.015) 
    
REACHt    -0.047** 
(0.014) 
  










































































































































































Year fixed effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 504  504  504  
First-stage F-statistics (Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F-
statistics) 
21.73  29.81  12.53  
Cragg–Donald statistic for weak instruments based on 
the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical value 
19.65  25.01  12.48  
Strong instruments Yes  Yes  Yes  
Anderson-Rubin (p-value)  0.025  0.025  0.025 
Hansen J  1.156  1.082  1.468 
Hansen J (p-value)  0.282  0.298  0.226 
Hausman’s endegoneity test (p-value)  0.010  0.006  0.026 






Notes: The table presents the two-stage least squares (2SLS) IV regressions to estimate Eq. 1 and Eq. 2 in the relationship between bank well-connectedness and capital risk. All 
variables are defined in Appendix A. Columns 1, 3, and 5 present the first-stage (Eq. 1) in which instruments, namely, BOARD_SIZE and N_BANK, are used to obtain the predicted 
values of each centrality measure, namely, DEGREE, REACH, and BETWEEN, respectively. Columns 2, 4, and 6 present the estimation of the second-stage analysis (Eq. 2) in which 
the predicted values for each centrality measure are used to predict the relationship between each bank centrality measure and capital risk (TIER-1). The table provides relevant tests 
undertaken to ensure the validity of the instruments and structure model. All analyses were run with robust standard errors. Coefficients are provided with p-values below in parenthesis 























































































































Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 504 504 504 
First-stage F-statistics (Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F-statistics) 22.82 19.42 21.73 
Cragg–Donald statistic for weak instruments based on the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical value 20.57 18.04 19.65 
Strong instruments Yes Yes Yes 
Anderson-Rubin (p-value) 0.120 0.005 0.015 
Hansen J 0.078 1.028 1.358 
Hansen J (p-value) 0.781 0.311 0.244 









Notes: The table presents the relationship between bank well-connectedness with the other US commercial listed banks and the following year’s bank risk exposures, namely, credit 
risk, insolvency risk, and capital risk over the period 2010-2015. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Column 1 in Tables 5, 6, and 7, respectively, presents the first-stage (Eq. 1) 
in which instruments, namely BOARD_SIZE and N_BANK, are used to obtain the predicted values of bank centrality measure, namely, DEGREE. The table presents the estimation of 
the second-stage (Eq. 2) in which the predicted values for the DEGREE are used to predict the relationship between the bank centrality measure and the following year’s bank risk 
exposures. The table provides relevant tests undertaken to ensure the validity of the instruments and the structure model. All analyses were run with robust standard errors. Coefficients 
































Dependent Variables    
Credit risk NPA Accounting-based measure of asset quality which equals to non-performing assets over total loans. 
Nonperforming assets is the classification for loans that are in default or are in arrears on scheduled payments of 
principal or interest. It includes: 
1. Loans and leases carried on a non-accrual basis 
2. Loans which are 90 days past due both accruing and non-accruing 
3. Renegotiated loans 
4. Real estate acquired through foreclosure 
5. Repossessed movable property, 
and excludes past due loans not yet placed on non-accrual status (unless specifically included in non-performing 
assets by the bank). 
BANK COMPUSTAT 
Insolvency risk  Z-SCORE The natural logarithm of ((ROA+ CAR)/σ(ROA)), where ROA represents the return on assets which is calculated as 
the ratio of net income over assets, CAR represents the capital-asset ratio, and σ(ROA) represents the standard 
deviation of ROA. 
BANK COMPUSTAT   
Capital risk   TIER-1 The Basel Tier 1 capital ratio which is calculated as follows: equity capital plus minority interests less portion of 
perpetual preferred stock and goodwill as a percent of adjusted risk-weighted assets. The minimum requirements 
under the Basel II and Basel III are 4% and 6%, respectively. 
BANK COMPUSTAT  
Independent Variables    
Degree centrality DEGREE The first-degree connections of the focal bank which is calculated by summing the number of banks that a focal bank 




Reachability centrality REACH The number of banks in the sample that the focal bank can reach occurs in two steps. It is calculated by summing 
the bank degree centrality and degree centrality of its first-degree connections. For instance, if bank “A” has a degree 
centrality of four, this means that bank A is connected with four banks. If each one of these four banks has a degree 




Betweennes centrality BETWEEN The number of the shortest paths linking any two banks in the network that pass through the focal bank. BoardEx Database 
Control variables    


















EDU_EXPERT Ratio of the number of directors who hold accounting, finance, and/or banking certificate to the total number of 




Bank size LOGSIZE The natural logarithm of bank total assets. BANK COMPUSTAT 
   
Bank risk VOLATILITY The natural logarithm of the annualized standard deviation of the relative price change for the 260 most recent trading 
days closing price, expressed as a percentage. It measures the risk that the price of the bank stock fluctuates that is 
calculated from the standard deviation of day to day historical price changes. 
Bloomberg 
Market-to-book  PROFIT The natural logarithm of the ratio of the last price per share over the book value per share. BANK COMPUSTAT 
Bloomberg  
 




DELTA Ratio of the change in CEO compensation to annualized standard deviation of the relative price change for the 260 




CEO stock award CEO_AWARD The natural logarithm of total stock award that has been given to a bank CEO in a fiscal year. Bloomberg 
 
Bank funding  DEPOSITS Ratio of total deposit to total liability. BoardEx Database 
Bloomberg 
 
Liquidity  LOANS Ratio of total loan to total assets. BANK COMPUSTAT   
Bloomberg 
 
Cost efficiency EFFICIENCY Bank cost efficiency measured through comparing costs to revenues. It is calculated as (Operating Expenses / ((Net 
Interest Income + Commissions & Fees Earned + Other Operating Income (Losses) + Trading Account Profits 
(Losses) + Gain/Loss on Investments/Loans + Other Income (Loss) - Commissions & Fees Paid) + Taxable 






Dividends payout DIVDEND The natural logarithm of the ratio of total dividends to total assets. BANK COMPUSTAT   
Instrumental variables    
Board size BOARD_SIZE The natural logarithm of the number of directors on the board. BoardEx Database 
Bloomberg 
 
Number of banks  N_BANK The natural logarithm of the number of banks headquartered in the state where the focal bank is headquartered. BANK COMPUSTAT  
  
 
i A stable environment is characterised by small unpredictable changes or low levels of volatility (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). 
ii We used the terms well-connectedness and centrality interchangeably throughout the study. 
iii The Basel II capital framework establishes a minimum requirement for a Tier 1 capital of 4% of risk-weighted assets, while the Basel III capital framework increases the minimum requirement for a Tier 1 capital of 6% of 
risk-weighted assets. 
iv In the three figures, the bank name is shown for the ten largest banks in the sample. 
v For brevity, we show only the result of the DEGREE centrality measure. The regression results for REACH and BETWEEN provide consistent evidence. Tables with detailed results are available on request. 
vi By applying the well-capitalised categories under Basel II, which represents a 6% Tier 1 risk-based capital, we find that approximately 1% of banks are not very well-capitalised over the sample period (i.e., hold Tier 1 
risk-based capital less than 8%). The results still provide consistent evidence after excluding these few banks. Tables with detailed results are available on request. 
                                                            
